Conservation initiatives to protect valued species communities in human-dominated landscapes 23
face challenges linked to their potential costs. Conservation covenants on private land may 24 represent a cost-effective alternative to land purchase, although many questions on the long-term 25 monitoring and enforcement costs of covenants and the risk of violation or legal challenges 26 remain unquantified. We explore the cost-effectiveness of conservation covenants, defined here 27 as the fraction of the high-biodiversity landscape potentially protected via investment in 28 covenants versus land purchase. We show that covenant violation and dispute rates substantially 29 affect the estimated long-term cost-effectiveness of a covenant versus land purchase strategy. 30
Our results suggest the long-term cost-effectiveness of conservation covenants may outperform 31 land purchase as a strategy to protect biodiversity as long as disputes and legal challenges are 32 low, but point to a critical need for monitoring data to reduce uncertainty and maximize 33 conservation investment cost-effectiveness. 34
INTRODUCTION 35 36
Despite an urgent need to develop mechanisms to promote biodiversity conservation (Bayon and 37 Jenkins, 2010; Estes et al., 2011) , developing such mechanisms in human-dominated landscapes 38 primarily under private ownership is particularly challenging (Naidoo et al., 2006; Wunder, 39 2007) . One potentially cost-effective route to conservation in such areas may be to promote 40 private land conservation covenants or easements that prohibit land use changes likely to reduce 41 conservation values in exchange for monetary or other compensation (Knight et al., 2011; 42 Merenlender et al., 2004) . Advantages of covenants include their low initial cost compared to 43 land purchase (Pence et al., 2003) and their ability to facilitate voluntary conservation with 44 landowners wishing to retain title (Knight et al., 2010) . Covenants have thus gained global 45 attention as conservation tools (Fishburn et al., 2009; Gordon et al., 2011) . 46 47 However, few studies identify the conditions likely to affect the cost-effectiveness of covenant 48 versus land purchase strategies for biodiversity conservation (Armsworth and Sanchirico, 2008; 49 Fishburn et al., 2009 ). For example, because no systematic studies of the long-term costs of 50 monitoring, enforcing or defending covenants against legal challenges exist, it is possible that 51 existing comparisons of land purchase versus covenant approaches to conservation overestimate 52 the cost-effectiveness of covenants (e.g. Copeland developing strategies to address potential financial risk in future (Land Trust Alliance, 2009), 57 detailed studies of these potential challenges are lacking. It also remains unknown whether 58 covenants offer similar levels of biodiversity protection as compared to land purchase (Fishburn 59 et al., 2009; Merenlender et al., 2004) , despite that an increased demand for covenants, often 60 without proportional increases in funding, is underway (Fitzsimons and Carr, 2014) . These 61 uncertainties highlight the critical need for the development of theoretical frameworks capable of 62 evaluating the cost-effectiveness of biodiversity conservation via the establishment of 63 conservation covenants versus fee simple land purchase. 64
65
We developed a simple theoretical framework for simulating conservation outcomes to help 66 define and elucidate the uncertainties above, using detailed data on biodiversity and property 67 values to compare the total cost and effectiveness of land purchase versus conservation 68 covenants as strategies to restore critically endangered Old Forest and Savannah habitats and 69 bird communities of the Georgia Basin of northwestern North America, where <20% of the 70 threatened landscape is owned by governments, and only 9% has been allocated to conservation. 71
Specifically, we asked two questions about the long-term (100 year) cost and biodiversity value 72 of covenant versus land purchase strategies: 1) how might dispute rate influence the cost-73 effectiveness of conservation covenants as compared to land purchase? 2) Assuming that 74 violations reduce the area of covenants allocated to conservation, what is the total area of the 75 high-biodiversity landscape protected over the long-term given investment in covenants versus 76 land purchase? To answer these questions we used detailed distribution maps for 47 bird species 77 and expert elicitation to map high-biodiversity landscapes in the region, and detailed assessment 78 data to represent land cost. We then contrasted land purchase scenarios developed by Schuster et 79 al. (2014) to maximize biodiversity conservation to parallel scenarios that substituted covenants 80 and local practitioners. Our approach offers a new theoretical framework for evaluating land 82 acquisition strategies for biodiversity conservation and highlights a critical need for empirical 83 analyses to estimate the total costs of long-term monitoring and the potential costs and expected 84 rate of legal challenges. 85 86 87
MATERIALS AND METHODS 88 89

Ethics Statement 90
Permits or permission for the use of bird point count locations were obtained from Parks Canada 91 (locations in National Park Reserves), private land owners (locations on private land), or did not 92 require specific permission as they occurred on public right of ways (e.g., roadsides, regional 93 parks). As private land owners did not want their information posted publically please contact 94 the authors for contact details. The field studies did not involve endangered or protected species. 95
This study did not require approval from an Animal Care and Use Committee because it was a 96 non-invasive observational field study, and did not involve the capture and handling of wild 97 animals. 98
99
Study region 100
We studied a 2520 km 2 portion of the Coastal Douglas Fir (CDF) ecological zone of the Georgia 101 PrePrints communities endemic to the region, but ≥ 60% has been converted to human use (Austin et al., 104 2008) and ≤ 0.3% of historic old forests (>250 years) (MES, 2008) and ≤ 10% of oak woodlands 105 extant prior to European contact remain (Lea, 2006 (Main et al., 1999; Parker, 128 2004 ). We compiled estimates of fixed covenant costs including: legal, financial advice, 129 registration and endowment fees, as well as scalable costs of property surveys and appraisal 130 (Table 1) . Land managers also identified reoccurring costs of annual monitoring and staff time to 131 address land owner requests (Table 1) . All costs were estimated in present day Canadian dollars, 132 because the alternative of using discount rates equal to the inflation rate for costs incurred over 133 time and reporting in future dollar values, has been shown to be highly sensitive to the discount 134 rate chosen, leading to substantial uncertainties about future dollar amounts (Arrow et al., 2013) . 135 136
Conservation covenant scenarios 137
We calculated the cost-effectiveness of alternate scenarios as the fraction of the high-biodiversity 138 landscape protected, divided by the total reserve network cost for each scenario (Wilson et al., 139 2007 ) and then standardized this value by the cost of land purchase for comparisons. We 140 followed Rissman & Butsic (2011) to estimate the distribution of dispute costs and fitted a cost 141 profile bound between $1000 and $400,000 following the power function cost[$] = 4845.78 * 142 disputes -0.701 . We also explored cost profiles including dispute costs over $400k using a truncated 143 normal distribution with mean of $400k, SE of $1M, and 1% probability of those costs arising 144 but found similar results, and thus restricted our analysis to published values. To find the 145 covenant dispute rate that caused the cost effectiveness of land purchase to exceed that of 146 covenants, we used dispute rates of 0.028, 0.28 and 2.8% of covenants per year. Rissman & 147 Butsic (2011) surveyed 205 land trusts to report that they experienced about 2.8 disputes per 148
year, but because they did not record the total number of covenants represented we could not 149 estimate dispute rates precisely. 150
151
In each year of simulation, covenants suffered disputes at rates assumed above and, given a 152 dispute, were assigned a randomly drawn dispute cost that contributed to the total cost of 153 covenant scenarios. To quantify the effect of disputes on biodiversity values we assumed that 154 biodiversity loss followed the same distribution as dispute cost, bounded between 0 and 100%, 155 which was then used to reduce the disputed covenant's beta diversity metric. In the absence of 156 empirical study, we also relaxed that assumption by allowing variation in biodiversity loss to 157 follow a normal distribution around the estimate (SD=5% of total biodiversity loss possible). All 158 analyses were conducted using R v.3.0.2 and the analysis script can be found in Appendix S1. 159 Including dispute rates of 0.028 and 0.28% increased long term costs in covenant scenarios by 2 168 and 23%, respectively (Figure 1a ). However, with 2.8% of covenants experiencing disputes 169 annually, network cost increased up to 400% (mean = $546M, range = $524 -570 M), exceeding 170 the cost of land purchase (Figure 1a) . 171 landscape. However, under the assumption that disputes cause biodiversity loss, a dispute rate of 174 0.028% reduced the area effectively conserved after 100 years by 0.75% (range = 0.11 -1.49%) 175 compared to baseline (Figure 1b) . In contrast, an intermediate dispute rate (0.28%) returned a 176 mean reduction of 7.31% (range = 5.25 -9.25%), and a high dispute rate (2.8%) returned a mean 177 reduction of 53.62% (range = 49.33 -57.7%; Figure 1b We show that covenant violations and disputes can substantially affect the long-term cost-188 effectiveness of conservation strategies that employ covenants and land purchase to protect high-189 biodiversity landscapes. In particular, land purchase outperformed covenants as a cost-effective 190 approach to protection when dispute rates were high, in part because disputes may also reduce 191 the level of biodiversity protection (Figure 1b integrity (Smith, 2009) . Although our assumption that biodiversity loss and dispute cost vary 228 directly is simplistic, and not yet tested with empirical data, we suggest it is a reasonable initial 229 assumption given that covenant violations often involve land clearing, road building or new 230 structures likely to reduce the integrity of high-biodiversity habitats. Our results therefore 231 emphasize that covenant disputes may add management costs and also fail to prevent 232 biodiversity loss, and make it clear that these potential costs must be considered when comparing 233 biodiversity conservation strategies. 234
Conclusion 236
Our results suggest that over the long-term, the cost-effectiveness of conservation covenants may 237 outperform land purchase as a strategy to protect or restore critical habitat, as long as the rate of 238 disputes and legal challenges to covenants remain low. We identify several actions that could 239 improve the reliability of comparisons of the cost-effectiveness of land purchase and covenants 240 as approaches to biodiversity protection, including obtaining better quantitative data on: i) 241 covenant dispute rates and cost profiles over time, and ii) biodiversity loss given a dispute. Our 242 findings are general and thus should apply to areas with similar patterns of private ownership and 243 human impact as occurs in the Georgia Basin of western North America, which is currently 244 subject to very high development pressures and land and/or opportunity costs of conservation. 
